This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. Working Paper: A dynamic theory of regulatory capture (2021) Regulatory complexity is also an avenue of capture and financial regulation ended up being highly complex and legalistic.
Working Paper: A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture (2021) References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEcĬitations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-law, nep-lma, nep-mic and nep-reg JEL-codes: D82 J45 K23 L14 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Keywords: collusion corruption dynamic games experts regulation regulatory capture revolving door (search for similar items in EconPapers) within the study of American politics and policymaking are more widely discussed than agency capture. Opening the revolving door conditional on the regulator's report may increase social welfare. Preventing Regulatory Capture - October 2013. Moreover, we show that cooling-off periods may make all players worse off if timed wrongly. We highlight that closing the revolving door may give rise to other inefficiencies. In this paper we explore the extent to which regulatory capture theory can explain changing politics and practices when globalisation becomes. This renders ineffective standard anti-corruption practices, such as whistle-blowing protection policies. Moreover, the revolving-door channel need not require an explicit agreement between the firm and the regulator, but may work implicitly giving rise to an industry norm. like the Atlantic Coast Pipeline and Mountain Valley Pipeline have driven landowners long-standing claims of regulatory agency capture of the FERC. Regulatory capture is also known as a form of political capture or 'cronyism.'A short revision video on regulatory capture can be found here. Regulatory capture generally evokes negative images of private interests exerting excessive influence on government action to advance their own agendas at. It happens when a government agency operates in favour of producers rather than consumers.
It is the process by which regulatory agencies eventually come to be dominated by the very industries. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure. This is because the revolving door publicly signals the firm's eagerness and commitment to reward friendly regulators, which facilitates collusive equilibria. Regulatory capture is a theory associated with George Stigler, a Nobel laureate economist. In a dynamic setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruckįirms have incentives to influence regulators' decisions.
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